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FRAME FLOW BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE NEWS MEDIA AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON THE PUBLIC: FRAMING OF NORTH KOREA 
 
ABSTRACT 
Public opinion is likely to be susceptible to the way a government and the news media frame 
foreign countries, because unlike domestic issues, foreign news is typically beyond a person’s 
direct experience. How does the American public respond to foreign news when its government 
and the news media promote competing frames and change their prominence according to the 
relations between the United States and that foreign country? The present study shows this frame 
building and frame effects by using a public opinion poll and content analysis of U.S. policy 
statements and media coverage. North Korea was chosen because its visibility to the American 
public has increased since President George W. Bush designated it as one of the countries in the 
“axis of evil.” The results show that during a four-month period, the U.S. government and the 
newspaper produced three competing frames, and that the magnitude of the frames shifted as 
U.S.-North Korean relationships shifted. These shifts in turn made the American public choose 
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When it comes to U.S. foreign policy, three actors emerge: the U.S. government, the U.S. 
news media, and the U.S. public. However, the three actors do not equally contribute to foreign 
policy because it is rare for the public to exert a direct influence on either the U.S. government or 
the U.S. news media (Entman, 2004). Instead, the U.S. government and the U.S. news media are 
able to influence the American public’s perceptions and attitudes toward foreign countries.  
 An example is President George W. Bush’s State of Union address in 2002. He branded 
North Korea as part of the “axis of evil” along with Iran and pre-war Iraq, indicating that North 
Korea was a major threat to the security of U.S. citizens. After his speech, North Korea received 
intensive attention from both the U.S. government and the U.S. news media. The U.S. 
government and the news media framed North Korea in using multiple terms which would 
directly affect public perception of such things as North Korea as a U.S. security threat, or the 
U.S. government’s ability to productively negotiate with the country.  
When they consume these policy statements and news coverage concerning North Korea, 
the American people receive competing frames generated by the U.S. government and the news 
media regarding the country. This is “competitive situation” where people pay attention to 
competing frames, whether in equal or unequal amounts (Chong & Druckman, 2007). The level  
of attention given to the competing frames about North Korea is likely to be high because a 
foreign country is a complex world that is out of direct reach (Lippmann, 1922, McCombs, 
Danielian, & Wanta, 1995), making people rely increasingly on a government’s official 
statements and news coverage to understand foreign issues. The implications of frame 
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competition have started to draw scholarly attention (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Entman, 2003; 
2008), but few studies have addressed the question of how the public responds to competing 
frames having varying magnitudes, which are targeted toward foreign countries, and specifically 
North Korea.  
To fill this gap, the present study examines how the U.S. government and the news media 
frame discourse on North Korea and what specific frames are transferred from the U.S. 
government and the U.S. news media to the American public.  
 
FRAMING EFFECTS AND FRAME COMPETITION 
The present study is based on framing studies that directly address framing patterns of both 
presidents and elites, and the news media. The main focus of the study is how the U.S. 
government and the U.S. media frame discourse on North Korea. Gamson (1992) and Gamson 
and Modigliani (1989) provide a guiding definition of a frame, defining it as a core organizing 
idea for making sense of real-time events or issues. Specifically, Gamson and Modigliani (1987) 
define a frame as “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding 
strip of events, weaving a connection among them” (p. 143). Other scholars present similar 
definitions, arguing that a frame makes sense of reality for individuals and journalists (Entman, 
1993; Gitlin, 1980; Scheufele, 2004; Tuchman, 1978). This definition suits the present study’s 
purpose of conceptualizing and measuring frames built by the U.S. government and the U.S. 
news media. For example, President George W. Bush’s framing patterns of North Korea is likely 
to represent his major idea of how to organize policy statements on North Korea. The New York 
Times’ framing patterns of the country capture the newspaper’s core idea that guides coverage of 
the country.  
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However, governmental frames are different from media frames in terms of scope and 
level. First, governmental frames aim to facilitate desirable policies and constrain undesirable 
policies (Levin, 2005). Accordingly, they reflect a government’s policy preferences and try to 
make the public accept the preferences (Rottinghaus, 2008). By contrast, media frames base 
themselves on newsroom routines as to how to cover and interpret social reality (Tuchman, 
1978). That is why media frames capture the characteristics of news (Entman, 1991). Second, 
governmental frames have advantages over media frames in crafting foreign policy because the 
president and high-ranking officials control information flow from governmental departments to 
the news media by deciding which policy statements can be released (Entman, 2003). In this 
sense, governmental frames are likely to guide media frames, although the latter can affect the 
former.    
Framing scholars explain framing effects in terms of three social cognitive concepts: 
availability, accessibility, and applicability (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Scheufele, 2004, 
Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Availability means that information needs to be saved in 
memory for retrieval for attitude formations, and accessibility is the ready availability and 
activation of that information in the memory. Applicability refers to making connection between 
framed objects and a frame. For example, when government’s policy statements focus on an 
applicable connection between the axis-of-evil designation and North Korea, there are 
overlapping meanings and implications between the two terms. Chong and Druckman (2007) 
propose that such a connection is most likely to occur when interpretations conveyed by a frame 
and a frame’s persuasiveness are increasingly present. Therefore, when people store the 
meanings and implications of the axis of evil in memory and those pieces of information are 
easily accessible, people are able to make sense of the connection.   
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Several experimental studies found evidence of framing effects. For example, a conflict-
framed news story made people show negative feelings toward university administration (Price, 
Tewksbury, & Powers, 1997). Media framing of the Ku Klux Klan controversy significantly 
influenced tolerance for the group, with the perceived importance of different values mediating 
the effects (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). News stories focusing on either an issue or a 
strategy influenced individuals’ perceptions toward civic duty, and the effects were moderated 
by education (Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr, 2001). When an issue such as the introduction of 
the euro was constructed in terms of the human interest frame, individuals’ capacity to recall 
specific bits of information decreased (Valkenburg, Semetko, & de Vreese, 1999). When stem 
cell funding was framed in terms of either a benefit frame or an ethics frame, individuals who 
read benefit-framed stories were more likely to support the funding than those who read ethics-
framed stories (Shen, 2004).  
However, previous social cognitive explanations and subsequent findings did not 
consider the possibility that in the real world, people receive multiple frames, which have equal 
or unequal magnitude. This idea leads to frame competition. Chong and Druckman (2007) link 
this competitive nature to framing effects, and suggest that people consume messages that are 
likely to contain equal portions of multiple strong frames or weak frames or unequal portions of 
multiple strong frames or weak frames. The strength and prevalence of the frame in messages 
determine, to a substantial degree, the effects of framing on public opinion. Druckman (2001) 
also points out that multiple competing frames influence the effects of each individual frame on 
public opinion. Saris and Sniderman (2004) found that people demonstrated higher support for 
government spending on the poor when consuming two different frames invoking positive and 
negative responses than those consuming a single frame.  
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FRAMING AND FOREIGN POLICY  
Although these prior works serve as a useful guideline, their applications to U.S. foreign policy 
areas are limited because they concentrate on domestic issues such as stem cell research or racial 
discrimination, and do not explain how framing foreign countries affects public opinion. 
Furthermore, in foreign affairs, there are multiple competing frames, as there are in domestic 
social concerns such as immigration, financial crisis, or crime. These social concerns can be 
learned by people’s personal experiences or interpersonal connections. However, understanding 
the nature of foreign affairs is fundamentally different from that of domestic social concerns. 
Foreign issues are far away from people’s everyday lives. Therefore, the American people 
cannot utilize their personal experiences to understand the implications of the U.S. government’s 
policy toward North Korea, unless they themselves are policy makers.  
Accordingly, an alternative theoretical work directly addressing the implications of a 
frame for foreign policy is needed, particularly Entman’s (2003, 2004) cascading network 
activation model. The basic idea behind this model is that a frame constructed by government at 
a high level activates relevant thoughts and feelings in elites and the news media at lower levels, 
and finally the public at the bottom. Although a frame can be pumped from the public to 
government, it is frequently observed in foreign policy areas that a top-down frame flow is more 
likely than such a bottom-up flow. However, government keeps an eye on the news media’s 
coverage patterns because of their influence on public opinion. In this light, the news media have 
the legitimacy to influence government’s foreign policy, as shown in prior research (Tallman & 
McKerns, 2000).  
According to Entman’s cascading network activation model, government and the news 
media have, to a greater degree than does the public, the power to initiate frames and distribute 
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them to the public by constructing an effective discourse about foreign countries. Such a 
discourse refers to the interactive process of developing meanings and communicating these to 
social actors (O’Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders, Montgomery, & Fiske, 1994). Discourse facilitated 
by government and the news media captures a president’s announcements in press conferences, 
radio addresses, and media coverage. This is part of elite discourse: it is initiated and promoted 
by elites such as the president, the president’s press secretary, or major newspapers (Zaller, 
1992). As Kinder and Sanders (1990) point out, an elite discourse involves a frame, and Simon 
and Xenos (2000) suggest that a frame provides connections between concepts in constructing 
political issues. Making connections between issues in a specific context is a crucial strategy for 
policy makers and the news media. Specifically, government and the news media compete for a 
frame in foreign policy areas because a frame defines what is accepted as reality and its 
interpretations. Entman (2003) points out this frame competition by using the “frame 
contestation” between President George W. Bush and journalists on Afghan issues as an example. 
President Bush focused on military attacks on the Taliban government of Afghanistan as his 
remedy frame. In response to Bush’s frame, two journalists, Seymour Hersh and Thomas 
Friedman reported the link of the Saudi government to terrorism and emphasized that the Saudi 
government could be a more serious danger than Afghanistan. In response to this frame 
competition, other U.S. major newspapers published follow-up news stories on the issue. This 
case exemplifies that a frame has counter frames and that this situation yields a continuum from 
dominance of a single frame to contestation among different frames to standoff between 
competing frames (Entman, 2003, 2008).  
Therefore, it would be reasonable to argue that the U.S. government and the U.S. media 
are likely to create frames reflecting their organizing principles when constructing discourse on 
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North Korea. The present study defines this stage as frame building and poses the following 
research questions, as no prior studies have provided clear guidelines as to the issues:  
RQ1: What frames did the U.S. government develop to construct discourse on North   
          Korea since President George W. Bush’s axis-of-evil speech?   
RQ2: What frames did The New York Times develop to construct discourse on North   
          Korea since President George W. Bush’s axis-of-evil speech?   
 
Given this frame building, another intriguing theoretical argument can be made regarding 
a frame flow between government and the news media. In his cascading network activation 
model, Entman (2003) predicts that a frame at a governmental level activates relevant framing 
devices on the news media side, and that the news media also spread their specific frames to a 
governmental level. One study (Wanta & Kalyango, 2007) found evidence for this prediction: 
when the U.S. president frequently applies a terrorism frame to foreign countries, The New York 
Times portrays the countries consistent with the terrorism frame. This implies a significant level 
of correspondence between governmental frames and media frames. Accordingly, the following 
hypothesis is predicted.  
H1: Since President George W. Bush’s axis-of-evil speech, the U.S. government frames  
were significantly correlated with The New York Times frames when they constructed 
discourse on North Korea. 
 
Given that competing frames moderate framing effects (Druckman, 2001), an important 
theoretical consideration is that the American public is likely to receive multiple frames in 
unequal magnitudes over time from the U.S. government and the news media regarding any 
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given country. Therefore, the first step for the success of the U.S. government’s specific framing 
patterns of North Korea requires their dominance in the news media coverage as well as in policy 
statements. The question then becomes, how could such frame dominance influence public 
opinion? Entman (2003) proposes that cultural resonance and magnitude determine the 
effectiveness of a frame. When framing North Korea, the U.S. government used symbols, 
metaphors, and images that are culturally accepted among the American people. Furthermore, 
those symbols and other framing devices appeared frequently and repeatedly over time in 
President Bush’s press conferences and addresses, and news coverage, which refers to the 
magnitude of a frame. With this in place, exposure to those framed messages does not lead to the 
acceptance of the U.S. government’s frames because the exposure only is not sufficient for 
framing effects (Scheufeule & Tewksbury, 2007). North Korean issues are not directly 
experienced by the American public, but obtained by such indirect channels as government 
policy statements and news coverage. In other words, North Korean issues are unobtrusive 
topical categories, which require substantial attention over time for assessing their implications. 
In terms of a historical context, the American public has invested a significant level of attention 
to North Korean news.  According to a public opinion survey conducted by Harris Interactive in 
June 2002, 93% of 400 American respondents paid a substantial amount of attention to news 
about the relations between the United States and foreign countries, including North Korea.  
When the American public is attentive to specific frames embedded in messages, as 
framing-effect studies suggest (Scheufele, 2004; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007), the attention to 
the frames likely activates relevant thoughts and consideration among the American people. 
They are able to connect those pieces of information and characteristics of foreign countries 
when deciding their positions toward the countries. This eventually leads the American public to 
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make decisions that are consistent with frames of the U.S. government and the news media.  
In the area of foreign affairs, frames promoted by government and the news media 
change according to current relationships between the United States and target foreign countries. 
For example, frames that the U.S. government and The New York Times construct to describe 
North Korea are likely to depend on changes in U.S-North Korean relations over time. When a 
North Korean military threat was imminent, the U.S. government would emphasize the severity 
of the threat and suggest its elimination. However, when the North Korean government moved 
forward on talks, the U.S. government would focus on negotiation with the country.  
In this regard, the more the U.S. government emphasizes the military threats of North 
Korea among competing frames with the bilateral relationship tilting toward confrontations, the 
more the American people pay attention to that frame because North Korean issues are not 
interpretable through their personal experiences. Then, they retrieve their prior affective 
evaluation of the country and the specific relationship between the two countries. This 
elaboration predicts attitudes toward foreign countries (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1992). As a result of 
the U.S. government’s focus on North Korea’s military threats, the American public is likely to 
prefer military solutions to the country.  
Conversely, the more the U.S. government emphasizes the non-military aspects of North 
Korea, the more the American people are likely to favor non-military solutions such as economic 
sanctions. The same prediction is made about The New York Times:  
H2: If the U.S. government shifts framing patterns of North Korea from a military-threat 
frame to a non-military frame over time, and the American public pays attention to the 
non-military frame, the public is likely to favor non-military solutions. 
H3: If The New York Times shifts framing patterns of North Korea from a military-threat 
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frame to a non-military frame over time, and the American public pays attention to the 




The U.S. government’s policy statements and The New York Times’ news stories were examined 
during a four-month period from January 29, 2002, the day when President George W. Bush 
delivered the axis-of-evil speech, to May 31, 2002, the day before a public opinion poll survey. 
The four-month period was determined with regard to the following: first, on January 29, 2002, 
Bush’s axis-of-evil speech maximized contrasting images of South Korea and North Korea to the 
American public. The two Koreas serve as a unique case because unlike Iran and pre-war Iraq, 
the two Koreas have been divided for more than 50 years, with South Korea remaining as an ally 
and North Korea as an enemy of the United States. Second, the most suitable public opinion poll 
for answering the research questions and testing the hypotheses was the one conducted on June 1, 
2002. 
During the time frame, President George W. Bush’s policy statements concerning North 
Korea originated from the website of the White House (2006) and The Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents in Public Papers of the Presidents (2006), an annual compilation of 
presidential statements. The compilation is a reliable source for collecting presidents’ policy 
statements (Wanta & Kalyango, 2007; Wood & Peake, 1998). Daily press briefing transcripts 
from the website of the Department of State were also used. The U.S. government’s policy 
statements on North Korea included President Bush’s press conferences, speeches, press 
briefings by the Department of State, and any other statements produced by the White House. A 
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general search term, “North Korea,” was used to locate a large pool of policy statements. During 
the same time frame, news stories of The New York Times concerning North Korea were 
collected from the website of LexisNexis Academic. The New York Times was chosen because of 
its leading role in foreign news (Barber & Weir, 2002; Carpenter, 2007; Pfau et al., 2004). The 
present study used the same search term, “North Korea,” as the one used for policy statements to 
identify stories on North Korea, including North Korea’s politics, its international policies, or 
relationships with South Korea.  
On the basis of prior research guidelines (Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 2005), the context unit was 
the entire contents of the U.S. government’s policy statements and The New York Times’ news 
stories concerning North Korea. The coding unit was a policy statement and a story, and the unit 
of analysis was the number of paragraphs containing frames. There were two considerations for 
adopting paragraphs as the unit of analysis. First, the pretest shows that the term, “North Korea,” 
tended to appear in small portions of a policy statement. By contrast, The New York Times’ 
stories dedicated virtually the entire content to North Korea because the country was the main 
focus of the stories. A direct comparison between policy statements and news stories required 
relatively large data points. In this regard, a paragraph would yield more data points than a 
statement or a story. Second, a paragraph has been accepted as the smallest unit of meaning 
because the meaning of a sentence is identified in the context of a paragraph (Jasperson, Shah, 
Watts, Faber, & Fan, 1998).   
 
Independent variables 
On the basis of prior research (Gamson, 1992; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; 1989), a 
frame of policy statements and stories was defined as a core organizing idea of constructing 
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meanings and allowing for interpretations on North Korea. The frame was likely to appear 
frequently and repeatedly over time, which was defined as the magnitude of the frame, as shown 
in prior research (Entman, 2003).  
As there were no guiding frames for this study due to limited research on President 
Bush’s axis-of- evil speech on North Korea and subsequent media coverage, the present study 
used the constant comparative technique (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in order to determine frame 
types. The constant comparative technique started from coding each case so that it captured as 
many coding categories as possible until no new categories emerged. The coding categories on 
North Korea which emerged from this technique included: (a) terrorism, nuclear threats, and evil 
country; (b) North Korean leaders’ suppressions of their people, North Korea’s abductions of 
foreigners, and hardships of North Korean defectors; and (c) North Korea’s readiness to engage 
in dialogue with the United States, and its compliance with international treaties and regulations. 
The first, second, and third set of categories were defined as the “military threat” frame, the 
“human rights” frame, and the “dialogue partner” frame, respectively, which were independent 
variables. The human-rights frame and the dialogue-partner frame were the non-military frame 
as opposed to the military-threat frame.  
The military-threat frame portrayed North Korea as a terrorism-sponsoring country that 
pursued or exported missile technology and weapons of mass destruction. One of the relevant 
policy statements was “The President was crystal clear in his State of the Union address about 
the growing danger posed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq and states like these. These are brutally 
repressive regimes that are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction” (Condoleezza 
Rice, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, April 8, 2002). One of the news 
stories mentioned that North Korea “still exports missiles and other arms, though in far smaller 
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quantities than a decade ago; it may still be quietly working on its long-range missile program; it 
might even have a ‘basement bomb’ project to develop nuclear arms.” In another example of the 
use of the military-threat frame, North Korea “remains heavily armed and threatening, and 
largely as a result of its excessive military spending, its citizens are extremely poor.”  
 The human-rights frame focused on the human rights abuse of the North Korean 
leadership such as suppressions of their people, North Korea’s abductions of foreigners, and 
hardships of North Korean defectors. On February 20, 2002, President Bush mentioned, “I’m 
troubled by a regime that tolerates starvation. I worry about a regime that is closed and not 
transparent. I’m deeply concerned about the people of North Korea.” The New York Times article 
reported, “About 200,000 North Koreans are confined in a prison camp system where conditions 
are so harsh that an estimated 400,000 have died over the last 30 years.” Other articles reported 
on a German human rights activist who was expelled from North Korea for exposing the 
country’s human rights violations to the world.  
The dialogue-partner frame described North Korea as a country with which the United 
States could resolve pending issues through dialogue because the country has complied with 
international regulations and a self-imposed missile moratorium, unlike pre-war Iraq and Iran. 
The U.S. government’s dialogue-partner frame indicated that his administration was ready to talk 
with North Korea and would not attack the country: “We’re prepared to talk with the North about 
steps that would lead to a better future, a future that is more hopeful and less threatening” 
(President Bush, February 20, 2002). Another example was “We continue to await a response 
from North Korea to our longstanding proposal to meet with them” (Ari Fleisher, press secretary 
for President Bush, April 3, 2002). The dialogue-partner frame in The New York Times articles 
contained such descriptions as “North Korea has shown its ability to observe international 
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agreements” and “North Korean leader Kim Jong-il’s approach is the more appropriate and 
promising one.”  
The authors completed the coding, and two trained coders coded a randomly selected 10 
percent of the entire data to test intercoder reliability. Any coding disagreement was resolved by 
discussion, which yielded that Krippendorff’s alpha (Krippendorff, 2004) was .83 for the 
military-threat frame, .80 for the human-rights frame, and .82 for the dialogue-partner frame.  
 
Dependent variable 
A poll contained indicators of public opinion toward North Korea. The poll was obtained 
from “iPOLL” dataset at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of 
Connecticut. The poll was conducted by Harris Interactive from June 1, 2002 to June 30, 2002 
and was sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Through a national probability 
sampling, a total of 400 men and women 18 years of age and older participated in personal in-
home interviews. Because the 400 people participated in the face-to-face interviews, the response 
rates were 100%. To assess the level of attention of the American people to foreign news, the 
poll asked, “When you follow the news these days, how interested are you in reports about the 
relations of the United States with other countries? (0) no answers, (1) very interested, (2) 
somewhat interested, (3) hardly interested at all, (4) don’t read newspapers, (8) not sure, and (9) 
decline to answer” (poll number: Q300A4). The category of “9” was coded as a missing value, 
which was also applied to the following two questions.  
To test framing effects, the present study established such a temporal order that the poll 
was conducted after a series of the U.S. government’s policy statements and The New York 
Times’ stories. Therefore, the temporal order allowed for a possible causal link between frames 
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and public opinion. Regarding non-military solutions, the poll question asked “On another issue, 
do you favor or oppose the use of economic sanctions against North Korea? (0) no answers, (1) 
Yes, favor sanctions, (2) No, oppose sanctions, (8) not sure, and (9) decline to answer” (poll 
number: Q675A). Regarding military solutions, the other poll question asked “There has been 
some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the 
world. I’d like to ask your opinion about some situations. First, would you favor or oppose the 
use of U.S. troops if North Korea invaded South Korea? (0) no answers, (1) favor, (2) oppose, 
(8) not sure, and (9) decline to answer” (poll number: Q535A01).  
Therefore, if the American public’s attitudes toward North Korea were influenced by 
frames used by the U.S. government and the newspaper, their attitudes were likely to reflect such 
changes in the magnitude of the non-military frame and the military-threat frame. The dependent 
variable was the American public’s specific attitudes toward North Korea, which were measured 
as the proportions of respondents who favored non-military solutions and opposed military 
solutions. If the proportions were significantly high, they were likely to be consistent with 
predictions made in the second and third hypotheses.  
 
RESULTS 
In order to construct discourse on North Korea during the four-month period ranging from 
January 29, 2002 to May 31, 2002, the U.S. government used 171 paragraphs (4.3 paragraphs per 
every three days) for 43 policy statements, and The New York Times used 535 paragraphs (13.4 
paragraphs per every three days) for 85 stories.  
[Insert Table 1] 
The first research question asked what frames the U.S. government developed to 
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construct discourse on North Korea since President George W. Bush’s axis-of-evil speech. Table 
1 shows that during the four months, the U.S. government developed three competing frames to 
construct discourse on North Korea: military threat, human rights, and dialogue partner. The 
three competing frames were present in discourse on North Korea in a disproportionate manner 
over time. From January 28 to February 28 and to March, the U.S. government framed policy 
statements concerning North Korea in terms of military threat, and North Korea as dialogue 
partner remained a competing frame during the same periods. However, the dialogue-partner 
frame was dominant in April. The visibility of the human-rights frame drastically decreased until 
it resurged as a dominant frame in May. The second research question asked what frames The 
New York Times developed to construct discourse on North Korea since President George W. 
Bush’s axis-of-evil speech. The New York Times showed framing patterns dissimilar and similar 
to Bush’s. During the first month, the newspaper used military threat and dialogue partner as two 
competing frames, but in March, human rights surged as a major frame while the previous two 
competing frames’ visibility noticeably decreased. However, as in the U.S. government’s 
framing, dialogue-partner and human-rights frames dominated the newspaper’s coverage in April 
and in May, respectively. 
The first hypothesis posited that since President George W. Bush’s axis-of-evil speech, 
the U.S. government frames were significantly correlated with The New York Times frames when 
they constructed discourse on North Korea. To test the hypothesis, this study used Spearman’s 
rho correlations because rankings of frames were likely to capture frame competition. For each 
month, rankings of the three frames used by the U.S. government were compared with those of 
The New York Times, yielding Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2] 
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 There were perfect correlation coefficients because the sample size was only three, given 
that there were three frames. Nonetheless, they were significant, supporting the first hypothesis. 
These findings prompt the need for consideration of both Table 1 and Table 2. First, when the 
government dropped the human-rights frame to describe North Korea in March, The New York 
Times stopped using the same frame in the following month, although it was dominant in the 
newspaper in March. This indicates the influence of the U.S. government on the newspaper’s 
framing patterns of North Korea. Conversely, the newspaper continued to reduce usage of the 
military-threat frame the first month and in April, the proportion of the military-threat frame was 
down to only 3.3% of the entire frames. The U.S. government started to reduce the proportion of 
the military-threat frame in April, and in May, it dropped the frame from discourse on North 
Korea. This shows that the newspaper influenced how the government framed North Korea. 
Accordingly, these findings reveal that there were reciprocal influences between the U.S. 
government and the newspaper. 
The second hypothesis expected that if the U.S. government shifted framing patterns of  
North Korea from a military-threat frame to a non-military frame over time, and the American 
public paid attention to the non-military frame, the public was likely to favor non-military 
solutions. The third hypothesis predicted that if The New York Times shifted framing patterns of 
North Korea from the military-threat frame to non-military frame over time, and the American 
public paid attention to the non-military frame, the public was likely to favor non-military 
solutions. The Harris poll data found that 62% of 400 American respondents showed a high level 
of attention to news about U.S. relations with foreign countries and 31% of them paid a 
substantial level of attention to it. Instead of choosing the “no answer” category, 0.8% of the 
total respondents chose the “decline to answer” category, which was coded as missing values. 
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Therefore, the American people were likely to follow news about U.S.-North Korean relations. 
[Insert Table 3] 
As Table 3 shows, 58.8% of the survey respondents favored economic sanctions, and 
only 32.5% of the respondents favored military solutions. Because the respondents answered the 
two questions in the same survey, however, these decisions obscured the hypothesized framing 
effects. Table 4 breaks down responses given by the respondents on the two questions in terms of 
nine attitudinal patterns. The missing values were eliminated because they remained less than 1% 
of the total responses per each question. Accordingly, the total respondents for analysis were 394.  
[Insert Table 4] 
The nine attitudes were significantly related to the two types of solutions, indicating 
preference for economic sanctions over military solutions (χ2 (1, df = 4) = 45.277, p = .001). This 
means that the preference for economic sanctions and opposition of military solutions (attitude 1) 
recorded the highest proportion (31.5%), followed by preference for both non-military and 
military solutions (23.4%) and opposition of the two solutions (15.5%). The preference for 
military solutions and opposition to economic sanctions (attitude 5) was only 7.1% of the total 
responses. Before the poll, the U.S. government shifted framing patterns from the military threat 
of North Korea to dialogue partner and human rights two months before the poll was conducted. 
The New York Times changed framing patterns in the same way as the U.S. government.  
 In this respect, the reason why the preference of non-military solutions to North Korea 
was highest was that the American public’s attitudes toward the country followed changes in 
frames used by the government and the newspaper. The survey question (poll number: 
Q535A01) assumed a hypothetical situation such as North Korea invading South Korea. 
However, it is hardly a feasible option to attack North Korea when the country is a dialogue 
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partner or when the country is criticized mainly for violating human rights in terms of 
international standards. A realistic option would be non-military solutions such as international 
warnings or economic sanctions. Therefore, the second and third hypotheses were supported. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The present study assesses the extent to which frame competition exists in the U.S. government’s 
policy statements and a major newspaper’s coverage regarding North Korea. It also examines 
how frame building by the two counterparts influences the American public’s attitudes toward 
the country. The U.S.-North Korean relationship provides interesting contexts regarding frame 
building and framing effects. Following President Bush’s axis-of-evil speech, both the U.S. 
government and The New York Times actively developed specific frames that were applied to 
North Korea. Three frames – military threat, human rights, and dialogue partner – competed in 
the government’s and the newspaper’s discourse on North Korea, with the magnitude of each 
frame changing according to political and security conditions of a specific period. Information on 
North Korean issues is not obtained through people’s direct experiences. Accordingly, the 
American people rely on competing frames for interpretation, and reflecting changes in those 
competing frames, the American public preferred non-military solutions to North Korea.    
 These findings make three meaningful contributions to existing framing studies. First, the 
present study provides empirical evidence for Entman’s cascading network activation model, and 
in particular, his proposition of two-way frame flows between government and the news media. 
Entman (2004) argues that hegemony and indexing models fall short of explaining the media-
government relationship in the post-Cold War era. Hegemony and indexing approaches suggest 
that the media generally mirror or index the dialogue of elites, and thus lack independent and 
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critical coverage of foreign policy issues. In comparison, the cascading network activation model 
emphasizes the increased independent influence of the news media on foreign policy issues 
(Entman 2004). That is, the White House no longer holds hegemonic control over foreign policy 
discourse, and the news media have enhanced their power to challenge the White House’s 
framing of foreign affairs issues, although Entman assumes that governmental frames have 
significant influence on media frames.  
In the present study, as the government reduced the magnitude of the human-rights frame, 
the newspaper dropped the same frame in the following month. Conversely, as the newspaper 
significantly decreased the usage of the military-threat frame, the magnitude of the frame 
completely disappeared in government policy statements in a later month. In this light, in foreign 
policy areas, the frame flows are not one direction from government to the news media, but 
instead, the two actors influence each other. This reciprocal relationship is convincing because 
government and the news media are major actors who circulate powerful frames and meanings. 
It will be interesting to study conditions under which the news media initiate frame building.    
 Second, the present study contributes our understanding of frame competition, which 
Chong and Druckman (2007) and Entman (2003) suggest is a key consideration for studying 
framing effects. As Chong and Druckman (2007) point out, most framing effects studies have 
focused on a single frame, excluding implications of frame competition. For example, in 
examining the effects of framing stem cell funding, Shen (2004) exposed people to only one 
frame such as a benefit frame or an ethics frame instead of allowing people to receive the two 
frames at the same time. Unlike most social concerns, which people are able to learn by 
observing their community and having discussions with their neighbors, interpretation of foreign 
affairs is a demanding task for the general American public because foreign issues are beyond 
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their personal experiences and their interpersonal network does not help much.  
Given this situation, competing frames provide the public with cues and guidelines for a 
better understanding of foreign countries. Thus, people pay attention to competing frames in 
either unequal or equal amounts. The present study is the first of its kind to analyze specific 
frames on North Korea from the perspective of frame competition, providing a foundation for 
future research on similar topics. Since President Bush’s axis-of-evil speech, the American 
people pay attention to the frames of military threat, human rights, and dialogue partner in 
government policy statements and news coverage. As U.S.-North Korean relations evolved into a 
specific situation, the stage of frame competition changed into frame dominance, such that the 
dialogue-partner frame was most prominent two months before the public opinion survey, 
followed by the dominance of the human-rights frame during the month before the survey. 
Interestingly, frame dominance over time is more apparent in the U.S. government than in The 
New York Times. In terms of its magnitude, the U.S. government preferred the military threat in 
March, dialogue partnering in April, and human rights before the survey. The three frames were 
relatively competitive in newspaper coverage during the same period. The American people who 
closely follow those frames are likely to store the frames in their memory. While people respond 
to survey questions asking them to make choices between non-military solutions and military 
solutions, the frames are likely to activate thoughts related to non-military solutions in the 
people’s memory. As Simon and Xenos (2000) point out, the frames allow people to connect 
between the thoughts and related ideas. Here, the thoughts and ideas were of North Korea issues, 
and in this case, non-military solutions were preferred over military solutions.  
 Finally, the present study examines framing effects in real settings as opposed to 
experimental settings. It shows a realistic picture of how political actors in foreign policy areas 
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exerted influence on the American people’s perceptions toward North Korea. Accordingly, the 
findings improve the present study’s ecological validity.  
It should be noted, however, that the present study cannot argue for explicit causality 
because there was no manipulation of frame competition and exposures to frames. Prior 
researchers (Saris & Sniderman, 2004) conducted experiments to determine the effects of dual 
frames on attitudes toward government spending on the poor. This indicates that a specific time 
lag should be considered when establishing causality. Another limitation is that the research 
period of four months is rather short. Future studies can examine a longer time period to examine 
the effects of competing frames on foreign policy issues. Therefore, the duration of a time lag for 
the strength of framing effects can be identified. It will also be useful to analyze those issues 
before and after President Bush’s axis-of-evil speech. Attention to specific news media, media 
content consumption habits (Bennett, Flickinger, Baker, Rhine, & Bennett, 1996; Drew & 
Weaver, 1990; Pan, Ostman, Moy, & Reynolds, 1994), and individuals’ expertise (Peffley & 
Hurwitz, 1992) predict the amount of knowledge of current issues and changes in attitudes. 
Follow-up studies need to examine how these variables mediate framing effects on the public’s 
attitudes and behaviors toward foreign countries or foreign leaders.  
 In sum, the U.S. government and a major newspaper actively engaged in two-way frame 
flows regarding North Korea. Over time, the U.S. government’s framing patterns of the country 
guided a major newspaper to frame North Korea. The major newspaper also influenced how the 
U.S. government portrayed the country. Two-way frame flows occur when multiple frames 
compete in the foreign policy arena. People receive these competing frames over time. 
Accordingly, people who closely follow policy statements and news coverage are likely to 
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TABLE 1 U.S. government and The New York Times frames during four months of 2002 
                                           Jan. 29-Feb. 28 March April May Total 
U.S. government  
 
     
 Military threat 30(49.2%) 32(71.1%) 5(15.6%) 0(0%) 67(39.2%) 
        
 Human rights 
 
11(18%) 0(0%) 2(6.3%) 25(75.8%) 38(22.2%) 
         
 Dialogue partner 
 
20(32.8%) 13(28.9%) 25(78.1%) 8(24.2%) 66(38.6%) 
        
 Total 
 
61(100%) 45(100%) 32(100%) 33(100%) 171(100%) 
 






































       




















TABLE 2 Correlations between the U.S. government and The New York Times frames  
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TABLE 3 American public’s attitudes toward North Korea 
      Favor    Oppose          Not sure     Decline to answer       Total 
 
Economic sanctions 235 (58.8%) 99 (24.8%)     62 (15.5%)       4 (1.0%)           400 (100.1%*)   
 
Military solutions 130 (32.5%) 218 (54.5%)   50 (12.5%)       2 (.5%)             400 (100%) 

































TABLE 4 Specification of the American public’s attitudes toward North Korea 
Attitudes Economic sanctions Military solutions Frequency (%) 
Attitude 1 Favor Oppose 124 (31.5) 
Attitude 2 Favor  Favor 92 (23.4) 
Attitude 3 Oppose Oppose 61 (15.5) 
Attitude 4 Not sure Oppose 29 (7.4) 
Attitude 5 Oppose Favor 28 (7.1) 
Attitude 6 Not sure Not sure 23 (5.8) 
Attitude 7 Favor  Not sure 18 (4.6) 
Attitude 8 Not sure Favor 10 (2.5) 
Attitude 9 Oppose Not sure 9 (2.3) 
 
Total   394(100.1*) 
Note: χ2 (1, df = 4) = 45.277, p = .001. * reflects a rounding error. 
 
